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I. TURTSDICTTON: 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3) (j) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended and the order 
of reference issued by the Utah Supreme Court dated August 20, 
1996. 
IL ISSUES AND STANDARD QF REVIEW; 
A. Ambiguity of Contract 
Whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law 
which the appellate court decides with no particular deference to 
the decision below under the correction of error standard. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P. 2d 796 (Utah App.' 1992) 
Interpretation of contracts is also a question of law, 
reviewed under the same standard. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993) 
1. The lower Court erred by holding that the contract was clear and 
unambiguous. 
2 . The lower Court erred in finding that there existed an enforceable contract 
between plaintiff and defendants. 
3 . The lower Court erred by reforming a clear and unambiguous contract. 
4 . The lower Court erred by ordering specific performance for an ambiguous 
contract. 
5 . The lower Court erred in ordering a sale which was in violation of existing 
water rights. 
6 . The lower Court erred in disposing of Mrs. Baldwin's rights in the 
property when Mrs. Baldwin was not a party to the contract upon which the 
lower Court based its decision. 
All of the above i s sues involve ques t ions of law and are 
t h e r e f o r e reviewable without deference t o the lower cou r t . 
B . Impropriety of Summary Judgment 
In reviewing grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals 
l i b e r a l l y construes the f ac t s and views the evidence in l i g h t most 
favorable t o the pa r ty opposing the motion, and, because summary 
judgment i s granted as a mat ter of law, Court of Appeals i s f ree 
t o r eappra i se the t r i a l c o u r t ' s l ega l conc lus ions . G.G.A., Inc. v. 
Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, (Utah App. 1989) 
2 
1. The lower Court erred by denying defendants1 motion for summary 
judgment. 
2. The lower Court erred by reversing the summary judgment previously 
granted to defendants. 
3. The lower Court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff 
when plaintiff had not moved for summary judgment. 
C. Procedural and Evidentiary Defects 
In equity cases the court's scope of review is broad, and the 
Court may weigh the evidence and determine the facts. Bustamante 
v. Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40,42 (Utah 1982) The Court is authorized 
to exercise a broad scope of review encompassing both questions of 
law and questions of fact. Notwithstanding the trial court's 
advantageous position in relation to questions of fact, when the 
trial court has based its rulings upon a misunderstanding and 
misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have produced 
a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to 
have the error rectified in a proper adjudication under correct 
principles of law. Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374,1377 (Utah 1980) 
The right to an equitable remedy is an exceptional one, and absent 
statutory mandate, equitable relief should be granted only when 
court determines that damages are inadequate and that equitable 
relief will result in more perfect and complete justice. An 
equitable remedy forecloses a legal one and vice versa. Thurston 
v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) The trial court's 
decision to bar evidence from admission is a question of law to be 
3 
r ev iewed f o r c o r r e c t n e s s . Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P .2d 796 (Utah 
App. 1992) 
1. The lower Court erred by granting both a legal and equitable remedy to 
plaintiff for the same alleged wrong. 
2 . The lower Court erred in refusing the jury instructions and corrections to 
jury instructions requested by defendants. 
3 . The lower Court erred in refusing to give the jury the special verdict 
interrogatories requested by defendants. 
4 . The lower Court erred by refusing to accept offers of proof by defendants. 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ETC.: 
Not a p p l i c a b l e . 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendants in this case are a married couple who have 
maintained their sole owned residence in Boulder Utah since the 
1960 !s. The property they own in Boulder consists of a home and, 
in front of that home on the state highway through Boulder two 
small buildings that have been, at various times, either a store 
or motel and a gas station or restaurant. Because of the economy 
in and about Boulder, Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin reside in the Mesa 
Arizona area during the winter, where Mr. Baldwin has a full time 
job with the city street department. Mrs. Baldwin and the 
children reside in their home in Boulder during the summer. 
4 
In June, 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin as lessors, entered into 
a lease agreement with plaintiff below, Ada ("Billie") Jones and 
Marylin Hansen as lessees, to lease the service station in front 
of Baldwins1 home for conversion by lessees to use as a 
restaurant. One of the amendments to that agreement was the 
removal of Ms. Hansen as a lessee. The identity of the owners and 
lessors was never changed. That agreement was modified and 
extended on several occasions. Eventually a new document was 
written up, using the original as a model. The new agreement did 
not include both Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin as parties. The original 
agreement contained a clause which addressed a "first option to 
purchase the property" along with some terms and conditions for 
establishing a sales price. The second agreement contained a 
clause which established a "first right of refusal" and which 
contained similar or identical terms and conditions for 
establishing a purchase price. 
In May of 1993, Ms. Jones sent Baldwins a letter which 
purported to be a tender of purchase under the second agreement. 
The tender was made after some discussions in which Mrs. Baldwin 
refused to sell the property and during which various offers, 
including persons not a party to the second agreement, were 
discussed and either rejected or abandoned. That "tender" added 
several terms that were not included in the agreement. In June, 
Mr. Baldwin wrote to Ms. Jones and explained that due to lack of 
water, the property could not be sold. Thereafter, Ms. Jones sued 
for specific performance of the purported offer to sell and 
damages for failure to do so. 
5 
B . Course of Proceedings 
After initial discovery was completed, plaintiffs moved for 
summary judgment. Judge Mower held a hearing and granted that 
motion. Plaintiff did not move for summary judgment at that time. 
After having lost the summary judgment, plaintiff moved to recuse 
judge Mower and Judge Tibbs was assigned to the case. Judge Tibbs 
reversed Judge Mower's decision and entered partial summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
After a trial in which the Court refused numerous offers of 
proof by plaintiff, the Court ruled in favor of plaintiff, granted 
specific performance as to all items requested by plaintiff, 
including those terms not included in any agreement, and submitted 
the question of additional damages to the jury. The jury found 
$8000 in damages. Those damages were awarded by Judge Tibbs in 
addition to the "specific performance" already granted. 
Defendants moved for a directed verdict or dismissal at the 
close of plaintiff's case. That was denied without explanation by 
Judge Tibbs. At the close of both cases, defendants requested 
that a special verdict be used and that certain jury instructions 
be given. Those requests were denied. After the jury returned 
its verdict and the Court made additional findings, defendants 
moved for a stay of execution pending appeal. That was likewise 
denied without explanation. 
The judgment and findings were written by plaintiff's 
attorney, in some cases in contrast to the findings announced by 
the judge, and signed by Judge Tibbs on or about December 19, 
6 
1995. The dec is ion was recorded (and t he r e fo re entered) on 
December 28, 1995. This appeal was t imely f i l e d from the e n t i r e 
judgment and proceedings . 
Yt RELEVANT FACTS? AND ftECORP CITATIONS; 
1. In the late 1960s David and Gloria Baldwin, together 
with Gloria Baldwin's parents, Howard and Ida Church, acquired 
some 30 acres of real property located in Boulder, Garfield 
County, State of Utah.1 
2. At the time of acquisition, there was located on the 
southwest corner of the subject property a small four-unit motel 
which was served by a single membership in the Boulder Farmstead 
Water Company.2 
3. Not long after acquisition, Defendants located a 
personal residence on the subject property in close proximity to 
the small motel and extended the water service to that residence.3 
4. Within a year following location of their personal 
residence on the subject premises, Defendants commenced 
construction of a service station near by, which they completed in 
due course and extended the water service to said service station. 
5. For a period of time around the turn of the 60-70s 
decade and during the early 1970s, the single water membership 
1
 Tr. pp. 309-312. 
2




 Tr. pp. 167-171. 
7 
serviced the small motel, Defendants1 personal residence and the 
service station, all of which are in reasonably close proximity on 
the southwest corner of the property.5 
6. During the early to mid 1970s, Defendants ceased 
operating the small motel and it fell into a state of disrepair. 
The water service to the motel was discontinued and it has not had 
water service since that time.6 
7. During the early 1980s Defendants also discontinued 
operation of the service station and from that time until the 
initial lease arrangement with Plaintiff and her partner in 1884, 
the Boulder Farmstead Water membership served only Defendants1 
personal residence.7 
8. Under date of June 6, 1984 Defendants entered into a 
Lease Agreement with Plaintiff Ada Jones and her partner, Marilyn 
Hansen, who proposed to operate a cafe in the premises previously 
operated as a service station. The Lease Agreement was essentially 
drafted by Hansen with some input from Plaintiff and Defendant 
David Baldwin.8 
9. The initial Lease Agreement was amended by 
interlineation and the copy now before the Court is the initialed 
5
 Tr. pp. 167-171. 
6
 Tr. pp. 167-171. 
7
 Tr. pp. 167-171. 
8
 Tr. pp. 289-294. 
8 
version. A second Agreement was entered into between David Baldwin 
and Ada Jones on August 12, 1992.9 
11. The agreement of August 12, 1992 was written in the hand 
of David Baldwin and signed by him and the Plaintiff. A copy of 
that agreement was admitted at trial as Exhibit 2 and is hereafter 
referred to as the "agreement," or the "second agreement."10 
12. Paragraph 3 of the agreement is at issue in this 
litigation. It makes reference to a possible purchase by 
Plaintiff. Though labeled a "right of refusal," Plaintiff claims 
it is an "option" exercisable by her at will.11 
13. The Plaintiff and her partner required both David and 
Gloria Baldwin to sign the initial Lease Agreement, but did not 
require Gloria, a joint owner of the property, to sign the second 
Agreement.12 
14. Some time between the initial Lease Agreement and the 
second Agreement, Plaintiff began using a portion of the old motel 
as a gift shop. She later discontinued the gift shop and used a 
portion of the old motel as a personal sleeping area, but without 
any plumbing or water service.13 
15. During the time covered by the two subject leases the 
single membership in the Boulder Farmstead Water Company has 
9
 Id. See also, trial exhibits 1 and 2. 
10




 Tr. pp. 289-294; trial exhibits 1 and 2. 
13
 Tr. p. 440. 
9 
served both Defendants1 personal residence and the service station 
remodeled as a cafe.14 
16. Defendants are the owners of the subject membership in 
the Boulder Farmstead Water Company.15 
17. The Boulder Farmstead Water Company recognizes a single 
membership serving both the residential and commercial uses of a 
single owner, but will not split such membership.16 
18. At the time of initial purchase, the full acreage was 
owned in undivided interests between the Baldwins and the 
Churches, who are Mrs. Baldwinfs parents. There have been 
subsequent transfers between these parties, but it has always been 
understood that Baldwins are the owners of the parcel on which 
their home is located and would be entitled to a deed to the 
same.17 
19. Within the two years prior to this litigation a major 
portion of the 30 acres originally purchased was sold to one Mark 
Austin. Both Baldwins and Churches had an equitable interest in 
the property sold. The sale excluded the parcel whereon Baldwins1 
home is located.18 
20. A couple of months after signing the August agreement, 
probably in October of 1992, Plaintiff and a friend, Mark Austin, 
14
 T r . p . 2 0 7 . 
15




 T r . p p . 167-169. 
18
 T r . p p . 244-245 . 
10 
approached Defendant David Baldwin about buying all of Baldwins f 
property, including the cafe and motel, the personal residence and 
some adjoining acreage. Baldwin said "maybe."19 
21. In December of 1992 the Plaintiff called David Baldwin 
and requested a price for the cafe, house and adjoining acreage. 
David Baldwin responded in writing, quoting a price of $320,000 
for everything.20 
22. Defendants did not quote a separate price for the cafe 
alone, and the next contact between the parties was a proposed 
"Tender" which Plaintiff had her attorney, Jackson Howard, prepare 
and send to Defendants. A copy of the Tender document was admitted 
as Exhibit "3." It suggests an approach to appraising the 
property, or in the alternative arbitrarily fixes a price of 
$40,000 for the leased premises. As appears on the face of the 
document, it includes additional terms not included in the 
parties1 written Agreement.21 
23. Defendant David Baldwin responded in a writing of June 
10, 1993, a copy of which was admitted as Exhibit "5." The 
response withdraws the offer for sale and refers to a problem 
relating to a culinary water hookup. 
24. The culinary water hookup is through the Boulder 
Farmstead Water Company. Baldwins are the owners of one share 




 Tr. p. 160. 
21
 Tr. p. 423. 
11 
motel and personal residence. The water connection has served the 
residence since the early 1970s. The Boulder Farmstead Water 
Company has declined to split the Baldwins1 membership. A letter 
from the water company was admitted as Exhibit "4." 
25. on August 1, 1993 the Defendant David Baldwin furnished 
Plaintiff a writing stating that if he "would ever decide to sell" 
the property being operated by Ada Jones he would give her credit 
of $15,036 toward the purchase price. When Baldwin gave Plaintiff 
this writing, there was no discussion about any of the other 
pending matters, including the Tender made through Plaintiff's 
lawyer and David Baldwin's response that he was withdrawing the 
offer to sell. Plaintiff has acknowledged that the only way she 
would receive equity would be as a purchaser of the property.22 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decisions of the Court below appealed in this matter are 
inconsistent with law, logic, and equity. The Court has entered a 
judgment purporting to enforce an agreement which is materially 
different from the writing which both sides agree constitute the 
agreement. At different times the Court has stated that the 
contract which it purported to enforce, was either ambiguous or 
non-ambiguous, depending upon what the Court was doing at the 
time. The decision below is wrong in either case. If the 
contract to be enforced is ambiguous, it is not suitable to 
specific performance. Nonetheless, the Court granted specific 
22
 Tr. pp. 155-157; 411-412. 
12 
performance. If the contract to be enforced is unambiguous, it 
may not be reformed. In this case the judge below reformed the 
contract to include price, particularities of survey, quality of 
title, method of conveyance of title, environmental warranties and 
abatement, and other material terms. Whether the contract was 
ambiguous or unambiguous, the judge's orders are inconsistent with 
the express terms of the agreement concerning how the price was to 
be fixed. 
The judge below ignored the plain language of the contract to 
change a right of first refusal into an option to purchase. He 
went further and allowed a purported tender to add to and vary the 
terms of the agreement under which it was purportedly made. In 
short, the decision below violates every basic principle of 
contract formation, interpretation, and enforcement. 
This case was initially decided in favor of Defendants in 
summary judgment. When Judge Tibbs was given the case, he 
reversed that decision and granted summary judgment for Plaintiff 
improperly. In light of the fact adduced at trial it is clear 
that Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The judge below made numerous extraordinary rulings against 
Defendants which prevented them from adequately trying the issues 
in the case. The Court not only refused to take evidence on 
issues framed by Defendants1 Answer, the Court even refused 
proffers of that evidence. 
The decision below was arbitrary, capricious, and must in law 
and good conscience be reversed. 
13 
VIIt ARGUMENT 
The gravamen of this appeal is that the Court below committed 
a fundamental error of law with respect to its interpretation of 
the contract on which the case is based. The contract at issue 
was a short, hand written document which contained some provisions 
of a previous typewritten agreement, some modifications of 
provisions of that previous agreement, some new provisions, and a 
change of parties. The lower Court held that hand written 
contract was sufficiently unambiguous to warrant granting specific 
performance. Specific performance can only be granted if the 
agreement to be enforced meets an unusually high level of clarity 
and certainty. 
The contract which gave rise to this suit failed that test on 
its face because the provision which the lower Court construed as 
an option to purchase expressly states that it is a right of first 
refusal. Since there is a facial conflict between the result 
reached by the Court below and the wording of the document, there 
is, a fortiori, an ambiguity. The Court below concluded that the 
right of first refusal was not a first refusal, but an option, 
because of the language of a previous contract which had been 
changed in arriving at the final contract. The Court held, 
starting at page 663 of the transcript: 
12 The Court finds the parties subsequently entered 
13 into an agreement, as set forth in EXHIBIT NO. 2, which 
14 purports to be a lease, also, although it's designated by 
15 the grant; that Mr. Baldwin is the grantor and Mrs. Jones is 
16 the grantee. 
17 The Court finds that in order for understand this 
18 agreement you must compare it with EXHIBIT NO. 1 ... 
Page 664 
14 The Court finds that a tender was made in 
15 conformity with the law, that there was no justification for 
14 
16 a refusal to comply with the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, and the 
17 Court finds that the defendants refused to comply with the 
18 option; and the Court finds that although EXHIBIT NO. 2 
is 
19 ambiguous in places, that the only way it can be 
construed, 
2 0 reading paragraph 3, is that the plaintiff had a right 
to 
21 purchase the property to make an option on the 
property. 
The lower Court's holding violates the doctrine of 
construction to give meaning to all parts of the contract and the 
Parole Evidence Rule, which requires that extrinsic evidence 
varying meaning of the contract will not be taken to modify the 
terms of a clear and unambiguous contract. 
In other words, the Court below held that a contract was 
clear and unambiguous because the contract had a facial ambiguity 
that required reference to previous contracts to determine what 
the second contract meant. Once it considered the previous 
contract, the Court felt the second contract was clear. The 
Court's determination that there was no ambiguity was on the basis 
of extrinsic evidence which it could only consider if the 
underlying contract was ambiguous. The decision below was 
therefore legally, as well and logically, fallacious. 
The genesis of this error of law was when Judge Tibbs was 
assigned to the case and reversed the well reasoned Summary 
Judgment decision of his predecessor judge. 
Plaintiff in the case below was awarded specific performance 
of a contract which plaintiff urged required the sale of land. The 
15 
judge below held that contract was ambiguous.23 It is hornbook law 
that a court may not: grant specific performance unless the 
contract is completely clear and unambiguous. The Supreme Court in 
Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (Utah 1967) held: 
Specific performance cannot be required unless all 
terms of the agreement are clear. The court cannot 
compel the performance of a contract which the parties 
did not mutually agree upon. See Bowman v. Rayburn, 115 
Colo. 82, 170 P.2d 271. 
In speaking of certain terms required for specific 
performance, the author in 4 9 Am. Jur., Specific Performance, 
Section 22, at page 35 uses this language: 
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, and 
ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to 
be supplied by the court. It must be sufficiently 
certain and definite in its terms to leave no 
reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended, and 
no reasonable doubt of the specific thing equity is 
called upon to have performed, and it must be 
sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the court 
may enforce it as actually made by the parties. A 
greater degree of certainty is required for specific 
performance in equity than is necessary to establish a 
contract as the basis of an action at law for damages. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The contract at issue was far from being "sufficiently 
certain and definite in its terms to leave no reasonable doubt as 
to what the parties intended, and no reasonable doubt of the 
specific thing equity is called upon to have performed.7' The 
contract at issue was missing essential terms, and the order of 
the court required defendants to perform in ways not even hinted 
at by the agreement itself. 
This suit was to enforce a contract for sale of property 
which even Plaintiff maintains is jointly owned by David and 
Gloria Baldwin but, where the contract was signed only by one. 
23
 Tr. pp. 693, 1. 25 - 649, 1. 7. 
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That contract conspicuously omits to even mention the other 
property owner. In light of that facial disparity of parties, the 
only legal theory on which the Court below could justify forcing a 
sale as they have done is on some kind of agency theory. Since 
the agreement sought to be enforced does not mention any agency 
and Mrs. Baldwinfs expressed opposition thereto, the Court's sub 
rosa finding of proper parties is highly questionable. 
In G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989) 
this court states: 
In interpreting a contract, we determine what the 
parties intended by examining the entire contract and 
all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an 
objective and reasonable construction to the contract 
as a whole. Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 
(Utah 1982) . The cardinal rule is to give effect to 
the intentions of the parties and, if possible, to 
glean those intentions from the contract itself. LDS 
Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 7 65 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 
1988) . Additionally, a contract should be interpreted 
so as to harmonize all of its terms and provisions, 
and all of its terms should be given effect if 
possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.r 752 P.2d 892, 
895 (Utah 1988) . 
The focal point in this case is whether in light of the 
underlying lease provision, Leventisfs letter effectuated an 
option or if it created a right of first refusal which was 
open for ninety days. "An option to purchase property 
is a contract in which the owner of the property sells 
to the optionee the right to buy the property in 
accordance with the terms and conditions specified in 
the option." Spokane School Dist. No. 81 v. Parzybok, 96 
Wash.2d 95, 633 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1981). "A right of first 
refusal to purchase property is different from an 
option in that a right of first refusal is not binding 
unless the offeror decides to sell the property." 11 
S. Williston, Contracts Sec. 1441A, at 949-50 (3rd ed. 1968); 
Northwest Television Club, Inc. v. Gross Seattle, Inc., 26 
Wash.App. Ill, 612 P.2d 422, 425 (1980). (Emphasis added.) 
The agreement sought to be enforced expressly states that it 
is a "first right of refusal." The predecessor document used the 
phrase "first option to purchase the property." The lower Court's 
17 
construction of the second agreement as an option contravenes the 
well established rule of contract interpretation that a 
construction which give meanings to all the terms of a contract 
will be preferred over one which renders some term meaningless. 
The lower Court's decision amounts to holding the parties1 
determination to change specific wording was meaningless. 
The Court below justified its rewriting of the contract by-
stating it was ambiguous. As is shown above, that alone makes the 
decision illegal. Assuming, arguendo, that the contract was 
ambiguous, the duty of the Court is to effect the intention of the 
parties. The Court below ordered Baldwins to remove storage 
tanks, which both parties knew about, but which both sides agreed 
had never been discussed prior to Plaintiff's "tender". 
The evidence at trial was uncontested that it was legally 
impossible, because of lack of water and water district 
restrictions, to sever the two separate parcels; the residence 
which was not involved and the commercial property which was. 
Plaintifffs Sole theory below was that they had tendered 
performance and the tender had not been objected to timely. It is 
uncontroverted the tender included terms, such as a survey, ALTA 
title insurance, storage tank removal, severance of water rights, 
etc., which were different from or in addition to the terms of the 
agreement under which they purported to make the tender. A tender 
which varies the terms of the contract is a breach and therefore 
ineffective. Nevertheless, the Court below enforced that tender. 
As such, the enforcement of that defective tender is grounds for 
reversal. 
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A. THE COURT CANNOT WRITE THE PARTIES1 CONTRACT FOR THEM. 
"A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is 
that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient 
definiteness to be enforced."24 
Sufficient definiteness is required so that the Court is not 
left with the task of writing an agreement for the parties. "[T]he 
court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought to 
have made and enforce it."25 Although it is not necessary that the 
contract provide for every collateral matter or possible 
contingency, the parties themselves must have set forth with 
sufficient definiteness at least the essential terms of the 
contract.26 
B. A CONTRACT WHICH IS INDEFINITE AS TO A MATERIAL TERM 
CANNOT BE ENFORCED. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that where an 
agreement leaves open to future negotiation any material term, the 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961); accord Pingree v. 
Continental Group of Utah, 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976); D. H. Overmyer Co. v. 
Brown, 439 F.2d 926, 929); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 R2d 597, 600 (1962); 
Hansen v. Snell, 11 Utah 2d 64, 354 P.2d 10 , 1072 (1960). 
2 5
 Valcarce, 362 P . 2 d a t 4 2 8 - 4 2 9 / accord D. H. Overmyer Co., , 
supra . 
2 6
 D. H. Overmyer Co., supra,; Nixon & Nixon, Inc., v. John New-
Si Associates, 641 P . 2 d 1 4 4 , 146 (Utah 9 8 2 ) ; Kier v. Condrack, 
25 U t a h 2d 1 3 9 , 478 P . 2 d 3 2 7 , 330 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . 
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agreement is unenforceable.27 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
interpreting Utah law, has reached the same conclusion.28 
In Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 
(Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court refused to grant the 
plaintiff/lesseefs demand for specific enforcement of the 
following lease renewal provision: 
The Lessee shall have and is hereby granted the option to 
renew this lease ... upon the same terms and conditions 
contained herein except that the rental amount will be 
renegotiated; however, maximum total rental shall not exceed 
$900.00 per month. 
Factors of tax increase, costs of business increases or 
decreases, business volume and success, insurance costs and 
other reasonable allowance, will be the basis for terms of 
negotiation.29 
The trial court had held that the parties, had agreed upon 
"reasonable rent." It then determined for the parties what 
reasonable rent would be.30 
The Utah Supreme court, however, rejected this approach. The 
court recognized that the lower court's decision had the effect of 
nullifying the factors specified by the parties, and "substituting 
a new agreement to which the parties had not committed 
27
 Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 161 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988); Pingree, 
supra. Compare Nixon & Nixon Inc., supra, (agreement was 
enforceable since not uncertain as to essential term); Kier/ 
supra, (agreement was enforceable since only "incidental 
details" were left to future negotiation). 
28
 D. H. Overmyer Co., supra. 
29
 558 P.2d at 1320-1321. 
30
 Id. at p. 1321. 
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themselves.31 Moreover, the lack of any objective standard by which 
to evaluate the parties, opposing factual contentions concerning 
reasonable rent rendered the provision fatally vague and too 
indefinite for enforcement. Thus, the original lease was held to 
have expired under its own terms.32 Twelve years later the Utah 
Supreme court reaffirmed this position in Cottonwood Mall v. Sinef 
767 p.2d 499 (Utah 1988). Once again the dispute arose over an 
agreement to renew an existing lease. The oral agreement included 
a promise to renew the lease upon "reasonable terms."33 The court, 
however, found that the minor differences between the facts in 
Pingree and the facts in Cottonwood Mall had no affect upon its 
analysis: 
Defendant [lessee] would have us now do what we refused to do 
in Pingree. While it is true that defendant adduced evidence 
as to what would be a reasonable renewal term and what would 
be a reasonable rent, the trial court properly spurned 
defendant's invitation to find or make an agreement where the 
parties had themselves failed. Defendant argues that in 
Pingree, the court declined to fix the renewal rent because 
of the difficulty in balancing the several factors which the 
lease required the parties to consider in fixing the rent. 
Here, the defendant's argument continues, no factors are 
listed in the lease and the task is less complicated. We do 
not agree. In determining what is "reasonable rent," many 
factors must be weighed and put into the equation. Business 
judgments must be made ... Courts simply are not equipped to 
make monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating 
commercial world and are even less prepared to impose 










The court concluded that the original lease had terminated by 
its own terms and it would not be renewed f or the parties by the 
court.35 
Even before these decisions, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied this rule of law in D. H. Overmyer Co.,. This 
decision involved an attempted purchase of a corporation through 
the acquisition of its stock. The preliminary letter agreement for 
the sale of the stock had provided that a later contract would be 
executed. 
Among the provisions contained in the letter agreement was 
the requirement that the sellers would provide " [appropriate 
warranties, representations and indemnifications with respect to 
the financial status of the Corporation ... as represented by its 
balance sheet ... . "36 
The buyer later discovered that the sellers had not disclosed 
numerous significant liabilities of the corporation. The buyer 
nonetheless wished to proceed with the sale, but with either 
increased specificity in the warranties, representations, and 
indemnifications, or a reduction in the sale price. The parties 
were unable to reach an agreement, and the buyer sued for specific 
performance of the letter agreement. 
The district court found that the provision of the letter 
agreement relating to the sellers1 warranties, representations and 




 489 F.2d, p. 928. 
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specify which warranties, representations and indemnifications 
would be "appropriate." It, therefore, declined to grant the 
buyer's request for specific performance. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district 
court and articulated its reasons why the letter agreement could 
not be enforced: 
As concerns an agreement to enter into a contract, the 
general rule is that where the agreement itself contains all 
essential terms it may be specifically enforced even though 
the parties contemplated the subsequent execution of a formal 
contract. The converse of this proposition is that an 
agreement to enter into a contract will not be specifically 
enforced where the agreement is incomplete or indefinite as 
to substantial and material matters ... .37 
C. THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE A MEANS FOR FIXING THE 
PURCHASE PRICE WITHOUT THE FURTHER EXPRESSION OF THE 
PARTIES-
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently been unwilling to 
supply the missing elements for parties who have agreed on 
"reasonable" terms. For example, in Cottonwood Mall v. Sine , 38 
the Supreme Court stated: "In determining what is 'reasonable 
rent1 many factors must be weighed and put into the equation. 
Business judgments must be made ... Courts simply are not equipped 
to make monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating commercial 
world and even less prepared to impose paternalistic agreements on 
litigants." 
37
 Id. at 929. 
38
 767 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 1988). Other cases cited herein also 
support this point. 
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In light of the existing precedent, Utah Courts should not 
fix a price for the purchase of real property when the parties 
have only specified "fair market value." There are marked 
similarities between such a term and "reasonable rent." With minor 
exceptions, other courts which have undertaken to supply a meaning 
to "reasonable" price or "fair market value," have required that 
the agreement provide an "objective" means for doing so without 
requiring any additional expression by the parties themselves. 
Cases dealing with the subject matter have been assembled in 
an annotation appearing in 2 A.L.R. 3d 701; a photocopy thereof 
(together with the July, 1994 supplement) being attached hereto 
for review by the Court. The applicable rule of law is stated as 
follows: 
(O]ption agreements have generally been held unenforceable 
for lack of definiteness of price if the parties both fail to 
provide for a specific price to be paid for the property, and also 
fail to specify a practicable mode by which the price can be 
determined with certainty by the courts without any new expression 
by the pities themselves.39 
A small number of cases in the A.L.R. which at first blush 
might appear to support plaintiff's position, on closer 
examination are distinguishable and involve different contractual 
provisions. There are no Utah cases which support Plaintiff's 
position. 
39
 2 A.L.R. 3d. 703. 
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Both the initial Lease Agreement and the second Agreement 
entered into between these parties contained the following 
language: 
The purchase price shall be fixed, at that time, at fair 
market value, as established by the opinion of three (3) 
independent appraisers, to be selected by mutual agreement cf 
the Parties hereto. 
The agreement did not simply call for application of "fair 
market value," but called for the future selection, by mutual 
agreement, of three appraisers who would then fix the value. 
It should further be recognized that the contractual right to 
select appraisers may be of considerable value and should not be 
usurped by the Court when the parties have agreed otherwise. Who 
is selected to do the appraisals may be of major consequence as 
the Utah Supreme Court seems to recognize in Redevelopment Agency 
of Salt Lake C. v. Mitsui Inv., Inc.,40 The Court noted the wide 
disparity between the appraised values of the experts. The 
Plaintiff's experts pegged the value at $156,125 and $156,165 
respectively, whereas the Defendants two experts came in at 
$242,784 and $246,764. The Court recognized that the appraisal 
process is not wholly scientific: 
But the work of an appraiser, though it can be in a sense 
factual and scientific in some of its aspects, is also an 
art, in that it reflects the creative talents, the 
experience, the integrity, and in sum, the personalized 
judgment of the individual appraisers. It is his prerogative 
to select and analyze the various factors which seem 
important to him in arriving at his estimate as to value. 
40
 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974). 
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Therefore no one should be able to put him a straight jacket 
as to his method... 41 
The analysis lends support to the Court's refusal to assume 
the responsibility of defining what would be "reasonable" when the 
parties have failed to do so, and further suggests caution in 
deciding upon appraisers when the parties have reserved that right 
to themselves. 
Sensing the obvious inadequacy of the agreement reached, the 
Plaintiff, through the Tender drafted by her attorney, asks the 
Court to rewrite the Agreement to provide that each party select 
one appraiser and that the two then select a third. Such an 
agreement would be more workable, but the Court cannot exercise 
the powers of reformation when the parties have not so agreed. The 
only means in which the Court in this case could carry out the 
terms of the parties agreement would be to order them to agree on 
three appraisers . There is no objective means by which such could 
be accomplished. 
A review of the cases from the A.L.R. annotation reveals the 
soundness of the general rule of law that the court cannot supply 
the price if there is any new expression required from the 
parties. Goodwest Rubber Corp. v. Munoz ,42 relying on 1 Williston, 
Contracts, (3d Ed. 1957) § 41 and states that the language of the 
41
 Id. at p. 1373. The Court's expression was reinforced in Utah 
Dept. Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Utah 1964). 
42
 216 Cal. Rptr. 604, 605 (Cal. App. 1985). 
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agreement must provide a "practicable mode to determine price 
without any new expression by the parties themselves.43 
Similarly, in Tonkery v. Martina ,44 the court found the price 
"may be sufficiently definite if the amount can be determined 
objectively without the need for new expressions by the parties.45 
On appeal the Court of Appeals for New York affirmed, noting that 
the option "provided the method for selection of appraisers" 
concluding that this "provides an objective standard that renders 
the ... [option] definite and enforceable.46 
The Pennsylvania case of Portnoy v. Brown41 enforced an option 
which provided only that the price would be the "current market 
value at the end of the final term." The case is distinguishable 
because no additional expression was required from the parties, as 
in the case at bar. Reliance was placed on the Williston treatise 
on contracts [§41 (3d Ed. 1957)], a photocopy of which is attached 
hereto for review by the Court. The discussion in Williston is 
essentially about goods and services and not real property which 
rises to a much higher level of "uniqueness." Even then, 
Williston rs language is in accord with the language in the A.L.R. 
annotation. Williston states: 
43
 216 Cal. Rptr. p. 605. 
44
 562 N.Y.S.2d 895 (A.D. 4 Dept, 1990). 
45
 Id. p. 895. 
46
 Tonkery v. Martina. 577 N.E.2d 1042 (N.Y.App. 1971) 
47
 243 A.2d 444 (Penn. 1968) 
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If a promise indefinite as to price is capable of being made 
certain by an objective standard as, for example, extrinsic facts, 
it is enforceable.48 
The Portnoy court goes on to recite the Maxim, "id certum est 
quod cerium reddi potest' (that is certain which can be made 
certain)." While this phrase might be applied to a contract which 
employs only a standard of "fair market value," it could not be 
applied to an agreement that the parties will select three 
appraisers by mutual agreement at a future time; for that can only 
be accomplished by the parties themselves. There is no "objective 
standard" by which it can be enforced; and the very effort would 
run counter to the volitional nature of a mutual agreement. 
In summary, there is a complete absence of any legal 
authority for enforcing the type of "agreement to agree" which 
exists in this case. Where additional expressions have been 
contemplated by the agreements of the parties, as here, the Courts 
have declined to interfere, there being no objective way to supply 
that which must come from the parties themselves. 
D. THE COURT CANNOT REFORM AN AGREEMENT NOT MADE. 
obviously recognizing the inadequacy of the Agreement reached 
and its lack of sufficient definiteness to allow enforcement, 
Plaintiff advances a cause of action for reformation. The problem 
with the prayed-for relief is that Plaintiff is really asking the 
Court to write the agreement rather than reform it. She asks the 
48
 Id. at p. 133. 
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Court to impose an agreement upon on the parties which Plaintiff 
admits they did not make. Such is contrary to law. In the 
relatively recent case of Grahn v. Gregory, 49the Utah Court of 
Appeals articulated the applicable rule of law, to-wit: 
Reformation is appropriate where the written instrument is 
not in conformity with the parties agreement, not where the 
parties have failed to agree, we will not make a contract for 
the parties which they did not make, only reform a contract 
to reflect the agreement they actually made. 
Both at trial and during her deposition, the Plaintiff 
waffled a good deal about the meaning of paragraph 3 of the second 
agreement. During deposition her own counsel put the question to 
her with blunt, clear brevity. Her answer was equally clear and 
blunt and betrays the position she has taken in the litigation: 
BY MR. DAYNES: 
Q Turning to the agreement itself, what was your 
understanding that Paragraph 3 meant? 
A The right of refusal. 
Q What did that mean to you? 
A That, if David had another buyer, that he would come and 
let me know and I would have the opportunity to buy the 
property or refuse. 
(Ada "Billie" Jones deposition pp. 93-94, cited at trial at 
pp. 409-414.) 
49
 800 P.2d 320, 325-326 (Ut. App. 1990) 
E. THE PARTIES AGREEMENT DID NOT ADDRESS THE MATTER OF 
WARRANTIES, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THE WARRANTY AGAINST 
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS. 
Plaintiff's position, as adopted by the Court below, is that 
the conveyance must be by warranty deed. There simply is no such 
term mentioned in either agreement. 
Similarly, no environmental issues are even discussed, nor 
were there any negotiations on the matter. However, had the 
parties intended to allow a forced sale, there should have been 
because they are essential and represent an increasingly important 
area of concern in real estate transactions, as the following 
discussion supports. 
The Utah Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act imposes a heavy 
burden on all responsible parties. The Act defines a "Responsible 
Party" as including "the owner or operator of a Facility.50 A 
"Facility," in turn, is defined as "any building, structure, 
installation ... storage container ... or ... any site or area where a 
hazardous material or substance has been deposited, stored, 
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.51 The 
bottom line is that Defendants would be Responsible Parties and so 
would Plaintiff if she were to obtain title. The consequence of 
becoming a "Responsible Party" was recently set forth by the Utah 
Supreme court in Utah Dept.. of Env. Quality v. Wind River 
Utah Code Annotated § 19-6-302 (18) (a) (i) . 
Utah Code Annotated § 19-6-302 (5)(a)(i), (ii). 
30 
Petroleum52 in which it held that an owner of property is strictly 
liable for the cost of cleanup even if such owner did not actively 
cause the pollution; and further, once the Department of 
Environmental Quality identifies one Responsible Party, the latter 
bears the burden of locating and joining other responsible parties 
as codefendants. It is an onerous burden concerning which the 
matter of warranties is crucial. 
Plaintiff understandably raised the environmental warranty in 
her Tender, evidencing the essential nature of such a provision, 
but it was never negotiated nor agreed to by these parties and it 
cannot be supplied by the Court. On this issue, the Tenth Circuit 
decision in D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Brown,53 is squarely in point. 
Ten years ago, in the first agreement, before the passing of the 
environmental requirements discussed above, and before the 
appreciation in property that has occurred generally throughout 
Utah in recent years, the parties placed a minimum -maximum value 
of $70,000 - $120,000 on the premises. Plaintiff has now offered 
$40,000, less "equity" and costs of suit and the lower Court has 
enforced that. Plaintiff would give the Defendants a fraction of 
what they consider their property is worth, require them to assume 
the present environmental liability and then warrant and indemnify 
as against all future problems. Plaintiff wants more than the 
historical warranty of marketability, her tender insists on what 
is tantamount to a liability insurance policy. Defendants haven't 
52
 246 Ut.Ad.Rpt. 6, (Aug. 29, 1994). 
53
 439 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1971). 
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agreed to the former, let alone the latter; and Plaintiff has so 
acknowledged. 
F. PLAINTIFF HAS ADMITTED THAT THE PARTIES DID NOT REACH 
AGREEMENT ON THE ESSENTIAL TERMS OF PURCHASE AND THAT SHE 
WANTS THE COURT TO SUPPLY THOSE TERMS, 
Plaintiff's reformation effort evidences the inadequacy of 
the agreement reached. A comparison of the parties1 actual 
agreement with the language which Plaintiff's Complaint asks the 
court to supply is revealing. It evidences at once what the 
"essential terms" are and their absence from the Agreement. They 
were similarly absent from the parties negotiations. 
The following table shows that what plaintiff was awarded by 
the lower court vastly exceeds the terms agreed to between the 
parties: 
Agreement Language 
That the grantor hereby grants 
the use of to grantee certain 
restaurant (or cafe) and motel 
(or gift shop) property located 
in Boulder Utah, Garfield 
County, State of Utah. 
3. At any time during this 
agreement the grantee may have 
the first right of refusal to 
purchase said property. 
1 L a n g u a g e Requested In 
| Plaintiff'ss Complaint 
The property which is the 
subject of this agreement is 
generally described as the cafe, 
appurtenances and side yards 
traditionally and historically 
used as part of the cafe 
property. | 
3. The lessee is granted an 
option to purchase the subject 
property by giving the lessor 
written notice of her intent to 
do so during the lease period. 
The terms of purchase are set 
forth in provisions A and B 
following, to wit: [ 
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A. The purchase price shall be 
fixed, at that time, at a fair 
market value, as established by 
the opinions of three (3) 
independent appraisers, to be 
selected by mutual agreement of 
the parties hereto. 
B. The remaining terms of such 
purchase shall be established at 
that time by mutual agreement of 
the parties hereto. 
[No comparable provision] 
[No comparable provision] 
A. The purchase price shall be 
$40,000 or if the seller 
believes is worth more than that 
sum, and notifies the lessee in 
writing at the time lessee 
elects to exercise his option, 
then, the purchase price will be 
determined by appraisal, each 
party to select an appraiser and 
the two selected to select a 
third, and the value determined 
by majority vote of the 
appraisers shall be the sale 
price. The parties shall each 
pay one-half of the cost of such 
(appraisal. | 
B. The sale price so determined 
shall be paid in cash at time of 
closing which will be within 30 
days of the determination of 
sale price, at an escrow company 
in Garfield County, selected by 
Seller. | 
C. Title shall be conveyed by 
good and sufficient warranty 
deed, supported to owner's title 
policy to ALTA standards, 
showing the property free and 
clear of all encumbrances 
including environmental 
restrictions j 
D. The premises which are the 
subject of this lease option 
agreement are those 
traditionally used as a 
restaurant and leased by the 
lessee under the terms and | 
conditions of the agreement, 
Exhibit "B," which premises | 
shall be reduced to a survey 
description to be established by I 
a surveyor mutually acceptable j 
to both parties, the cost of j 
which survey shall be paid by j 
the seller. j 
[No comparable provision] E. The premises shall include 
the water right traditionally 
and presently utilized in and 
for the cafe and the utility 
easements presently used on the 
said premises. The seller will 
arrange to transfer to the buyer 
the water which presently 
services the premises in the 
quantity and to the pressure 
heretofore historically 
provided. 
Plaintiff was asked about most of these terms which her 
Complaint recognizes as essential. She was obliged to admit that 
there had never been an agreement reached thereon. Starting on 
page 411 of the trial transcript, plaintiff specifically admitted 
that there was no agreement to sell, and no agreement, on the terms 
that she was given by the court below. 
PAGE 411 
1 MR. WILLARDSON: Okay. 
2 Q Ifd like to you turn to page 90 in that 
3 deposition. At the top of the page, QUESTION: "Now you're 
4 saying that there was something else you requested be 
put 
5 in?" 
6 ANSWER: "On August 12th, when David was 
7 writing—when I was over there." Now that's August 12th of 
8 1992, isn't it? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q QUESTION: "You didn't get it put in on the 12?" 
11 ANSWER: "No." 
12 QUESTION: "Nor in between or on the 18th?" 
13 ANSWER: "No, it wasn't." 
14 QUESTION: "And what you specifically asked him to 
15 put in was — ?" 
16 ANSWER: "To be able to purchase the property and 
1 7 my equity in there. " 
18 QUESTION: "And it just never got in?" 
19 ANSWER: "It never got in." 
2 0 The QUESTION: "Alright, and then, it was never 
21 talked about again?" 
2 2 ANSWER: "No, not after the lease was drawed up." 
PAGE 412 
Is that a correct statement of your testimony 
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5 under oath? 
6 A Yes, it is. 
7 Q Let's go back to the terms of EXHIBIT 2, which is 
8 the handwritten f92 agreement. Do you understand those, the 
9 provisions in paragraph 3, 3-A and 3-B to be harmonious. 
10 MR. HOWARD: Objection, repetition. 
11 THE COURT: Sustained. 
12 Q BY MR. WILLARDSON: Do you agree that paragraph 
13 14 of the f92 agreement was a valid part of the agreement 
14 throughout its term. 
15 MR. HOWARD: Objection, it's irrelevant. 
16 THE COURT: Sustained. 
17 Q BY MR. WILLARDSON: I'd like you to look at 
18 EXHIBIT 1, paragraph 14; is that a correct statement of your 
19 intention in entering into that agreement? 
20 MR. HOWARD: Objection. Speaks for itself. 
21 MR. WILLARDSON: The question is as to her 
22 intention. 
23 MR. HOWARD: It doesn't matter. 
24 THE COURT: It doesn't matter. The objection is 
25 sustained.. 
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1 Q Paragraph 15, is that a correct statement of your 
2 intention. 
3 MR. HOWARD: Objection. That's irrelevant. 
4 THE COURT: Sustained. 
5 MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor,— 
6 THE COURT: It speaks for itself, counsel. That's 
7 all I can say. It speaks for itself. It's not ambiguous 5 
8 It speaks for itself. 
9 MR. WILLARDSON: Well, Ifm asking the witness to 
10 speak for herself. 
11 THE COURT: Well, Ifm just saying it's sustained. 
Compare Tr. pp. 693-4 where the Court denies that the 
contract was unambiguous as follows: 
19 MR. WILLARDSON: Provo City Corporation Vs. 
20 Nielson Scott Company, Inc., 603 PII 803, says the court 
21 will not [re]write an unambiguous contract. 
22 MR. HOWARD: That's Hornbook law. We all know 
23 that. 
24 MR. WILLARDSON: The Court has previously found 
2 5 that contract was unambiguous. 
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1 THE COURT: That's not so. 
2 MR. WILLARDSON: Okay. Then, Your Honor, if you 
3 have found that the contract is ambiguous, then I believe 
4 that we are entitled to an instruction requesting whether 
5 there was a meeting of the minds as to the parties. 
6 THE COURT: All right. That's denied. 
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12 MR. WILLARDSON: Let's go back to the tender. 
13 That seems to be something we can talk about. 
14 You previously told me that except for something 
15 about the appraisers and something about purchasing, none of 
16 the terms in that document had been agreed to by either Mr. 
17 Baldwin or Mrs. Baldwin; is that correct. 
18 MR. HOWARD: Objection. It's irrelevant. 
19 Furthermore, it speaks for itself. 
20 MR. WILLARDSON: I'm just trying to summarize the 
21 witness!s testimony so I can make sure that I don't have to 
22 replow any ground. 
23 MR. HOWARD: Her testimony doesn't have to be 
24 summarized. The jury heard it. We have heard it and I 
25 object to summarizations. 
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1 THE COURT: If there's something specific, 
2 counsel, let's get specific. The objection is sustained. 
3 Q BY MR. WILLARDSON: Prior to bringing this 
4 lawsuit, you had never discussed with either Mr. or Mrs. 
5 Baldwin the process for selecting the three independent 
6 appraisers, had you? 
7 THE WITNESS: I assume that it was, because it was 
8 in the lease. 
9 Q Prior to filing this lawsuit, you had never 
10 discussed the process for selecting the three independent 
11 appraisers with the Baldwins, had you? 
12 A Yes, I take that back. I did ask David to do 
13 a—make an effort to do an appraisal and he said it didn't 
14 matter what the appraisal was, he'd sell it for what he 
15 wanted. 
16 Q When did that happen? 
17 A It was when I was asking David for a price on it. 
18 If we couldn't come to a price, to at least have an 
19 appraisal done on the property. 
20 Q And would that have been in the latter part of 
21 December, '92, before he sent you the $320,000 offer? 
22 A Yes. 
2 3 Q You had never discussed with either Mr. or 
Mrs . 
2 4 Baldwin the idea that you would select one independent 
2 5 appraiser, they would select one, and then those two 
would 
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1 select a third, had you? 
2 A Not in those exact words, no. 
3 Q Had you discussed it in any approximate words? 
4 A I asked David to get an appraisal on the 
property. 
5 Q And they did not agree to do so, did they? 
6 A They did not do anything. 
7 Q They didn't agree to do so, did they? 
8 A They didn't disagree or agree. 
9 MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor, may I have an 
10 instruction to the witness concerning leading questions on 
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11 cross examination. 
12 THE COURT: No, you the may not. Ask your next 
13 question, counsel. It seems to me like she's answered to 
14 the best of her ability. 
15 MR. WILLARDSON: May I have a side-bar, please. 
16 THE COURT: Sure. Side-bar. 
17 BENCH CONFERENCE OUTSIDE THE JURY 
18 THE COURT: Say it quiet, counsel. 
19 MR. WILLARDSON: Sorry. 
20 I'm entitled to lead this witness on cross 
21 examination. 
22 THE COURT: Youfre entitled to what? 
23 MR. WILLARDSON: Lead this witness. 
24 THE COURT: Nobody stopped you from leading the 
25 witness. 
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1 MR. WILLARDSON: Okay. Therefore I'm entitled to 
2 have responsive answer to my leading question. It's 
3 possible for her to answer. Therefore, I should be entitled 
4 to have the witness instructed that if I ask a question that 
5 is capable of being answered, either yes or no, that she 
6 should answer yes, or no. And if not being answered yes or 
7 no, that she should so state. 
8 THE COURT: You didn't ask her to say yes or no, 
9 No. 1. No. 2, she answered your question. So she did. As 
10 far as I'm concerned, she did. And I'm not going to 
11 instruct her to do something I think she's already done, so 
12 that's the response. 
13 MR. WILLARDSON: Okay. 
14 CROSS EXAMINATION CONTINUED 
15 BY MR. WILLARDSON: 
16 Q I'm going to ask you a yes or no question and if 
17 you can, I'd like you to give me a yes or no answer. 
18 Prior to filing this lawsuit, did you discuss with 
19 either Mr. or Mrs. Baldwin that you—oh. I can go a little 
20 later than that. Prior to filing in lawsuit, did the 
21 Baldwins agree to select appraisers by you selecting one, 
22 they selecting one, and those two appraisers selecting a 
23 third one? 
24 MR. HOWARD: Object. I don't think that question 
25 needs to be answered yes, or no. 
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1 MR. WILLARDSON: It's a simple statement. Did 
2 they, or did they not? It can only be answered yes, or no. 
3 THE COURT: Well, the objection is overruled. She 
4 can answer it, if she can. Can you answer it yes, or no? 
5 THE WITNESS: Not really. 
6 Q BY MR. WILLARDSON: Why can't you answer it yes, 
7 or no? 
8 A Because of the statement that David made about 
9 appraisals being done. 
10 Q And is that the statement that you previously 
11 recounted to us? 
12 A Yes. 
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13 Q And did that statement include anything about 
14 three appraisers? 
15 A No. It just asked him to have the appraisal done 
16 on the property. 
17 Q And did Mr. Baldwin's statement include 
anything 
18 about how the three appraisers would be selected? 
19 A None, other than what's stated in the lease. 
2 0 Q I'm asking about Mr. Baldwin's statement that 
you 
21 recounted a moment ago, not about the lease? 
2 2 A No. He did not. 
2 3 Q And am I correct in assuming that Mrs. Baldwin 
2 4 didn't either? 
2 5 A That is correct. 
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1 Q Prior to filing this lawsuit, neither of the 
2 Baldwins had agreed to accept the full purchase price 
in 
3 cash, had they? 
4 A They never agreed to anything or disagreed to 
5 anything. 
6 Q Pardon me? 
7 A They never agreed or disagreed to anything. 
You 
8 could never get an answer from David. 
9 Q Do you know what ALTA standards are? 
10 A No. I do not. 
11 Q Do you know what environmental hazards exists 
on 
12 the property that has the cafe on it? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q What are they? 
15 A The underground tanks. 
16 Q And do you know how much it will cost to have 
17 those underground tanks removed? 
18 A I do not. 
19 Q And neither of the Baldwins ever agreed to 
remove 
2 0 those underground tanks, prior to the filing of this 
lawsuit 
21 either, did they? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Do you remember being—do you remember being asked 
24 by your, urn, counsel on direct about what you want out of 
25 this lawsuit? 
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1 A No. Oh, yes. The property. Yes, I do. I'm 
2 sorry. 
3 Q Do you want both the property and damages? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Prior to you filing this lawsuit, the Baldwins had 
6 not agreed to give you a option to purchase the property, 
7 had they. 
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8 MR. HOWARD: Objection. 
9 THE COURT: Sustained. The objection is 
10 sustained. That's what the whole lawsuit is about. 
11 MR. HOWARD: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: It's sustained. 
13 Q BY MR. WILLARDSON: Prior to submitting your 
14 tender, you'd never discussed the purchase price of 
$40,000 
15 to the Baldwins; isn't that correct? 
16 A I asked David what he wanted for it. 
17 Q And he told you $320,000; isn't that correct? 
18 A But that was for everything. I just wanted 
the 
19 cafe property. And he would never give me a price on 
it-
20 Q And Mr. Baldwin never told you he was willing to 
21 just sell you the cafe, did he? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q When did he? 
24 A In '92. 
25 Q And when, in f92? 
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1 A When Mark Austin and I was at his house, he said 
2 if I was to exercise my option, that he would let Mark buy 
3 the house. 
4 Q And did you discuss a price at that time? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Did he discuss any terms at that time? 
7 A No. 
8 Q And isn't it the case that the only price given 
9 for the two properties that were being discussed was 
10 $320,000? 
11 A But I did not want those. 
12 Q Isn't it true— 
13 MR. HOWARD: Wait a minute. She didn't finish. 
14 She hadn't finished. 
15 MR. WILLARDSON: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you 
16 were. 
17 THE WITNESS: I did not want any other property 
18 but the cafe property, and David and Gloria both knew that 
19 all along from the very very beginning from the first lease. 
20 Q At any time is it true that the only price that 
21 you ever received was for both properties? 
22 A Yes. That is the only price. 
23 Q And that was the only—only occasion when the 
24 Baldwins discussed with you the sale of the property that 
25 included the cafe. 
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1 MR. HOWARD: Objection, repetitious. 
2 THE COURT: Well, the objection is sustained. I 
3 think it is repetitious. 
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1 Q As far as you know, there are none; is that 
2 correct? 
3 A I don't know anything on it. He tried to buy the 
4 house and David would not sell it or give it to him. And he 
5 give him a price on it, so he went to Howard and Ida Church 
6 and bought the 28 acres instead. 
16 Q BY MR. WILLARDSON: Did you ever talk to the 
17 Baldwins about whether the water would stay with the 
house 
18 or go with the cafe? 
19 A No. I just assumed that it would go with the 
2 0 cafe. It was hooked up to the cafe. The meter was 
there. 
21 Q When what? 
22 A The meter was there. And I assumed that it would 
23 go with the cafe when it was purchased. 
24 Q And you're aware, aren't you, that that water 
25 right cannot be split, aren't you? 
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1 A No. 
2 Q You're not aware of that? I'd like to you turn to 
3 page 43 of your deposition. 
4 Okay. I'll start at the top. Witness looks at 
5 exhibit that's line No. 1. 
6 ANSWER: "Yes." 
7 QUESTION: "Was a copy of that furnished to you 
8 with his letter of June 10th?" And just for the record, 
9 that's EXHIBIT 6 to the deposition, which is the letter from 
10 the Boulder Water Company; do you agree with that? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Okay. So you were looking at this Boulder Water 
13 Company letter; right? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q "And was a copy of that furnished to you with a 
16 letter of June 10?" 
17 ANSWER: "Yes, it was." 
18 QUESTION: "It was your understanding that he had 
19 just one membership authorizing one water connection." 
20 ANSWER: "Yes." 
21 QUESTION: "Was that to go with the cafe, or stay 
22 with the home?" 
23 ANSWER: "It was to go with the cafe. It was a 
24 commercial hookup that was hooked up to the cafe first. And 
25 David hooked up the house when he bought the house. So then 
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1 it was hooked up to the cafe first and my understanding was 
2 that it should go with the property that it was hooked to." 
3 QUESTION: "I'm going to ask you on what you base 
4 your understanding." 
5 ANSWER: "Mr. Howard." 
6 QUESTION: "Who is Mr. Howard?" 
7 ANSWER: "Jackson Howard, my attorney." 
8 QUESTION: "But you don't claim that you and the 
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9 Baldwins ever visited about that." 
10 ANSWER: "Yes, we talked about water." 
11 QUESTION: "I want to you tell me about when." 
12 ANSWER: "After I received the letter from David, 
13 he said that he could not separate the water, and after 
14 that, it did not matter about the water to me. I just 
15 wanted to purchased the property." 
16 Was that your testimony in the deposition? 
1 7 A Y e s . 
18 Q Is that deposition testimony true? 
1 9 A Yes . (Emphasis added . ) 
Plaintiff admitted that the terms of her tender, such as ALTA 
title insurance, price, water rights, method of payment, abatement 
of environmental hazards were never discussed in making the 
agreement, nor at any time prior to the "tender." Far from being 
a suit to enforce an existing agreement, this suit was an attempt 
to get the Court to abuse its power by creating a new agreement 
that never existed. Unfortunately the Court below was willing to 
so abuse its power. 
G. THE MOST BASIC AND ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE PROPOSED 
PURCHASE WERE NEVER AGREED UPON. 
In asking the Court to rewrite the agreement Plaintiff 
recognizes that the parties have not even identified the property 
which would be the subject of the sale. There was no indication as 
to where the line would be drawn between the cafe and the home, no 
agreement for a survey, no agreement as to who should pay for a 
survey, and no inclusion or description of personality or 
appurtenances, and no agreement as to who should receive the 
single water right. Plaintiff's only understanding as to who 
should receive the water right was based on her conversation with 
her attorney, Jackson Howard, rather than any conversation with 
the Baldwins. In fact, she had never even discussed it with the 
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Baldwins. She further acknowledged that there is a flat 
disagreement between her and Baldwins on this issue. 3 6 
Reduced to bare-bones, the sole and only identifiable 
agreement was that the purchase price would be fixed by three 
independent appraisers selected by mutual agreement at a future 
time (Paragraph 3A of the Agreement) . That language, on its face, 
is an "agreement to agree" and therefore unenforceable as the 
cases heretofore cited make clear. Sensing the inadequacy, 
Plaintiff requests the Court to impose an approach whereby each 
party selects an appraiser and then the two appraisers select a 
third. Such would not require a future agreement. Perhaps the 
parties "ought" to have so agreed. The fact is, they did not, and 
reformation is therefore unavailable.55 
Subparagraph 3B is even more telling, since it simply states 
that "the remaining terms of such purchase shall be established at 
that time [in the future] by mutual agreement " This leaves 
open every term. Even if the Court could somehow force the parties 
to agree upon appraisers, the property to be appraised has not 
been clearly delineated. The Agreement leaves open the vital 
issues of warranties, (compare the Tenth Circuit decision in D. H. 
Overmyer & Co., supra) boundaries, what property is included, 
title insurance, etc. 
With respect to warranties, Plaintiff correctly perceives the 
importance of a warranty regarding environmental considerations 
and wants the Court to impose this upon Defendants. Mr. Baldwin 
Grahn v. Gregory, supra 
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testified that defendants had received a billing in the amount of 
$5,54 6.7256 from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality 
growing out of the underground storage tanks at the converted gas 
station (the cafe). Defendant David Baldwin testified that removal 
of those tanks would cost at least $15,000 to $20,000 even without 
determining if there was contamination.57 Plaintiff's appraiser 
testified, at page 286 of the transcript that the cost of removal 
of such tanks sometimes "far exceeds the value" of the property. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants never agreed to remove the 
tanks and there were no negotiations regarding environmental 
hazards and meeting Federal and Utah State Environmental 
requirements. The continuing liability for, soil contamination (now 
imposed by statute), renders a warranty on this item an extremely 
important issue in contractual negotiations. 
Negotiations between the parties regarding a potential 
purchase were minimal and concurrence almost non existent. 
Plaintiff acknowledged that the parties never reached any 
agreement beyond the bare language of Paragraph 3 of the 
Agreement. 
The Court cannot specifically enforce an agreement which does 
not contain the essential terms, and it cannot supply those terms 
under the guise of reformation when no agreement was reached. The 
court below, however, did not consider itself so constrained and 
the judgment appealed from does just that. 
56
 Trial exhibit 12, Tr. pp. 598-599. 
57
 Tr. pp. 610-611. 
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H. THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON THE SINGLE NONDIVISIBLE WATER 
MEMBERSHIP AND THE COURT CANNOT SUPPLY THE SAME. 
The essential nature of the entitlement to the single, 
nondivisible Boulder Farmstead Water membership is not open to 
question.58 Without it neither the cafe nor the Defendants' 
personal residence can be utilized. There is nothing in the 
parties Agreement, nor in the historical facts which this Court 
could rely upon in choosing the residence over the cafe or vice 
versa. 
In terms of historical priority, the residence enjoyed 
exclusive utilization of the single water membership prior to 
construction of the cafe. While utilization at the old motel 
predated that, such was discontinued some 20 years ago and could 
hardly be relied upon to boot-strap the cafe ahead of the 
Defendants! residence. 
I. IMPROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As can be seen from the discussion above, it is undisputed 
that the material terms of the contract Plaintiff was seeking to 
enforce were neither discussed nor agreed to in 1992 when the 
agreement was written. Since it is undisputed that the material 
terms of the contract were not agreed to, Defendants should have 
been granted summary judgment. 
58
 Trial exhibit 4 is a letter from the Boulder Farmstead Water 
District stating that the share could not be divided. That 
assertion was testified to at trial by Mr. Nelson and not 
rebutted. 
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It is undisputed that the contract signed in 1992 does not 
establish a price for sale of the property, but only a method for 
the parties to establish a price, and since that procedure was 
never followed, Defendants should have been able to obtain summary 
judgment. 
Since it is undisputed that the water right is essential to 
the use of both the property at issue and Defendants1 residence is 
indivisible and that therefore a sale is a legal impossibility, 
Defendants should have been entitled to summary judgment. 
Since it is undisputed that the terms of the "tender" set by 
Plaintiffs and Defendants both vary and add to the terms of the 
agreement under which the tender was purportedly made, that tender 
was ineffective as a tender and constituted merely an offer. That 
offer was rejected. Therefore, Defendants should have been able 
to obtain summary judgment. 
In fact, Defendants did obtain summary judgment. Defendants 
moved for summary judgment, had argument on summary judgment, and 
were granted summary judgment. All of those events occurred when 
the case was assigned to Judge Mower. Having received the verbal 
ruling granting summary judgment to Defendants, Plaintiff sought 
to and succeeded in having Judge Mower recused. Judge Tibbs, a 
retired judge, was assigned to the case. Judge Tibbs reversed 
Judge Mower's ruling and granted summary judgments to Plaintiff 
who had not moved for summary judgment. 
Since there was no motion and memorandum supporting summary 
judgment for Plaintiff, the only basis that Judge Tibbs could have 
made such a ruling upon was that on the face of the Complaint and 
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Answer Plaintiff had established its cause of action. Because the 
Complaint on which Judge Tibbs was ruling did not even include 
both of the parties who were the owners of the property as 
Defendant, and because the Complaint expressly asks for terms 
which are different from and in addition to the terms of the 
agreement upon which it was based, summary judgment was clearly 
inappropriate. 
Since the Court's trial of the case was limited by its ruling 
on summary judgment, the result below must be reversed. 
J. THE TRIAL BELOW WAS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE 
The Plaintiff sought, and obtained from the lower the court, 
both a legal and inequitable remedy. They received the equitable 
remedy of specific performance, and the legal remedy of $8,000.00 
in damages. It is hornbook law that equitable remedies exist to 
do justice when a legal remedy is inadequate. 27A Am. Jur. 2d 
Equity §§ 1, 29-30 (1996) states: 
[§1] "Equity" has been said to be the name of the principle 
or set of principles under which substantial justice may be 
attained in particular cases where the prescribed or 
customary forms of ordinary law seem to be inadequate. 
[§29] Historically, the test of equity's jurisdiction in 
any given case was that the suitor could not get relief or 
could not get adequate relief in a court of common law. It 
is accordingly said that the test of equity jurisdiction is 
the absence of a legal remedy. Subject to certain 
qualifications, if a judicially cognizable right exists, and 
no other adequate remedy is available, equity has 
jurisdiction and will grant appropriate relief, unless 
prevented by some supervening principle, and subject, of 
course, to the recognition of all equitable defenses. 
The availability of an adequate legal remedy is a 
threshold determination. The plaintiff must affirmatively 
show a lack of an adequate remedy at law on the face of the 
pleading and from the evidence. 
The mere existence of a possible remedy at law is not 
sufficient to warrant the denial of equitable relief. 
[§30] It is a basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that 
courts of equity should not act when the moving party has an 
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adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury 
if denied equitable relief. Equity jurisdiction is therefore 
generally excluded if there is an adequate remedy at law. 
Some decisions to this effect have been under statutes or 
rules of practice which prescribe this limitation on the 
jurisdiction of equity. Furthermore, some decisions refer to 
a constitutional provision which guarantees the right of 
trial by jury, and having held that such provision makes it 
necessary that the plaintiff proceed at law. Once a remedy 
at law has been resorted to, it must be exercised in its 
entirety before a remedy in equity may be sought. 
(Citations omitted.) 
In this instance there is neither showing by plaintiff nor 
finding by the court below that the legal remedy of damages was 
inadequate. As is discussed above, the equitable remedy itself 
should have been unavailable, but the Court awarded both. 
Defendants1 requested jury instructions on ambiguity, lack of 
meeting of the minds, intentions of the parties, etc. All those 
instructions were refused. While that refusal was consistent with 
Judge Tibbsf gratuitous grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff, 
they were inconsistent with the law. Plaintiff was seeking to 
enforce a contract. Defendants raised objections as to proper 
parties, meeting of the minds, ambiguity, enforceability, etc. in 
their Amended Answer. All of those theories were foreclosed by 
the Court both by its rulings on evidence, by its rulings of 
refusing jury instructions and by its refusal to give appropriate 
special verdict interrogatories. 
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The proceedings below were fatally flawed from the time that 
Judge Tibbs took over the case. The culmination of those errors 
was a judgment which creates a contract for sale of real property 
merely from Plaintiff's wish list. The lower court apparently 
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determined the result prior to the trial and would let neither 
logic nor law stand in the way of its desired outcome. At one 
point in the trial the judge held that the contract was 
unambiguous. Later the judge denied making such a holding. The 
judgment fixes a price based on the testimony of a single 
appraiser. That is in violation of the express terms of the 
agreement that the Court claimed it was enforcing. The Court 
required abatement of and warranty against environmental hazards. 
Such issues were never even discussed between the parties, and the 
uncontroverted testimony shows that such costs equal or exceed the 
purchase price of the property. The matter of water rights for 
the property were never discussed between the parties. Those 
water rights are indivisible. Nevertheless, the Court fashioned a 
contract which requires water to be supplied to the property in 
violation of the water right that does exist. The contract 
created by the Court is binding upon both Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin, 
but the 1992 agreement which the Court uses as an excuse for 
creating the new contract is signed by only one of the owners of 
the property. Early in the proceedings the Court recognized that 
both parties were essential to alienation of the property by 
allowing Plaintiff to amend her Complaint to include Mrs. Baldwin. 
The Court found no impediment in the absence of Mrs. Baldwin to 
the disposition of the property. Such a disposition violates the 
statute of frauds. 
Since it is contrary to law for a Court to order specific 
performance of an ambiguous contract, it is a fortiori illegal for 
the Court to order specific performance of a contract which omits 
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material terms and which has been created after the fact by the 
Court. The Court's decision must therefore be reversed. 
This case was originally set before Judge Mower. Judge Mower 
examined both sides and correctly concluded that Plaintiff had no 
cause. A summary judgment order was drafted. In what turned out 
to a successful attempt to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, 
Plaintiff moved to have Judge Mower recused. Judge Mower left the 
case, Judge Tibbs was assigned, and the case was won by Plaintiff 
at that point. Judge Tibbs granted summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff, in spite of the fact that Plaintiff had not even 
requested summary judgment. 
The trial which followed was a sham. Judge Tibbs foreclosed 
Defendants1 proof at trial, eventually refusing even to accept 
proffers. Judge Tibbs refused every jury instruction requested by 
Defendants. Judge Tibbs refused to give special verdict 
interrogatories requested by Defendants. The effect of all of 
those actions by the lower court was to prevent Defendants from 
obtaining a fair consideration of their position. 
The result below is contrary to both law and equity. It must 
be reversed. 
DATED;^ : ^ r iday , October 11, 1996. 
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